






















Scholars disagree over the extent to which presidential campaigns activate 
predispositions in voters or create vote preferences that could not be predicted. When 
campaign related information flows activate predispositions, election results are largely 
predetermined given balanced resources. They can be accurately forecast well before a 
campaign has run its course. Alternatively, campaigns may change vote outcomes beyond 
forcing predispositions to some equilibrium level. We find most evidence for the former: 
opinion poll data are consistent with Presidential campaigns activating predispositions, 
with fundamental variables increasing in importance as a presidential election draws near.  
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The debate over how presidential campaigns influence votes remains unresolved. 
When campaign related information flows activate predispositions, election results are 
largely predetermined given balanced resources. They can be accurately forecast well 
before a campaign has run its course. Alternatively, campaigns may change vote 
outcomes beyond forcing predispositions to some equilibrium level. A recent crop of 
scholars has sought to tackle this enduring question. Anderson, Tilley and Heath (2003) 
go beyond past work (e.g. Gelman and King, 1993) by demonstrating the effectiveness of 
fundamental variables in predicting the vote at both the individual and the aggregate 
level. They find voting patterns to be predictable despite the variability in polls leading 
up to Election Day, with campaigns working to move voters toward their personal 
equilibrium vote choices.  
From a different perspective, Hillygus and Jackman (2003) employ a new source 
of panel data to gain a deeper understanding of the relationship between campaign effects 
and public opinion. They claim to find evidence of both disequilibrating campaign effects 
and activation of predispositions where fundamentals explain vote choice. They label the 
former effect as “persuasion.”  However, a voter may be persuaded toward or away from 
their expected vote by campaign related information flows.  If voters are persuaded 
toward their predicted equilibrium attitudes, then Hillygus and Jackman’s results are 
consistent with the enlightened-preferences hypotheses of Gelman and King and 
Anderson et al. The findings of Hillygus and Jackman do not clearly point to campaign 
effects beyond activation of predispositions. Thus, it is not clear that they move beyond 
the conventional wisdom of minimal (disequilibrating) campaign effects.  
In this note, we provide two analyses to determine the explanatory power of 
activation on the vote. First, we fit a series of logistic regressions predicting vote choice 
based on the fundamentals in the months leading to a presidential election. Such a model 
has pointed to evidence of activation in past presidential election years (Gelman and 
King, 1993).  We provide further evidence by applying the model to the more recent 
2000 presidential election. Second, we offer a new algorithm for investigating the 
predictive power of the fundamentals free from disequilibrating campaign effects. 
Specifically, we use the coefficients from a model predicting the vote by the 
fundamentals in 1996 to predict the vote over the course of the 2000 presidential election 
campaign season.  
This paper is a response to Hillygus and Jackman in the sense that they imply 
disequilibrating campaign effects when their data do not necessarily confirm such effects. 
To make our point, we study the same time period as Hillygus and Jackman using another 
source of data.  
 
Mean Reversion or Random Walk Campaign Effects 
  
Scholars have long argued over the effect of campaigns in presidential elections 
(see Hillygus and Jackman, 2003, for an extensive review). Despite the extensive 
research in the area, no one has offered a complete explanation of what does “Do 
campaigns matter?” mean. We consider aggregate preferences as a time series leading up 
to an election, following the example of Wlezien and Erikson (2001). This time series 
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may be stationary, so that preferences have a mean reversion quality where final votes are 
predicted by predispositions. Or preferences may be better characterized as the result of a 
random walk where campaigns change or create preferences apart from how they would 
be predisposed to vote. To know which is true, a study of the mean reversion versus the 
random walk theory of elections is required.  
In the mean reversion model, voters have predispositions that can determine their 
vote even before they know what that vote will be. These predispositions are driven by 
the so-called fundamentals that determine election outcomes. Here, we shall estimate the 
effects of age (indicators for 18-29, 30-44, 45-64, 65+), region of residence (indicator for 
south versus non-south), income (five category continuous), sex, race (indicator for black 
versus non-black) and education (four category continuous) as fundamentals. We include 
ideology and party identification as fundamentals as well.1 They were normalized to 
account for the differing codes in the surveys employed. 
Using similar inputs, Gelman and King (1993) show convincing evidence that 
fundamentals are activated by information flows as campaigns progress and elections 
draw near. For the 1988 presidential campaign, they show an increasing effect of race and 
ideology but a decreasing effect of gender and region in determining the vote.  The 
predispositions that grow in importance are those that are out of equilibrium early in the 
election season. Anderson et al. (2003) similarly find that media coverage during election 
years helps voters select parties that better represent their ideological ideal points.  In 
2000, with relative certainty surrounding the eventual major party nominees coupled with 
the fact that they were well known among the American public, we would expect the 
fundamentals to be close to equilibrium even well before the election—but to the extent 
that the campaign changed attitudes, we would expect the fundamentals to become more 
important toward the end of the campaign. 
 
Increasing Importance of Fundamentals as Campaign Progresses 
 
Using the 2000 National Annenberg Election Survey, we fit a series of logistic 
regressions predicting vote choice based on the fundamentals in the months leading to the 
election.  The time interval represented by each snapshots is nearly two weeks for the 
surveys early in the election and decreases to days in the period just before the election 
when the survey was conducted more frequently.  For each snapshot t, we fit a model of 
the form, 
 
Pr(Yit=1) = logit-1(βtXit)    (1) 
 
where individuals are subscripted i within cross-section t; Yit equals 1 or 0 for supporters 
of Bush and Gore, respectively; Xit represents a matrix of covariates (the fundamentals); 
and βt represents a vector of coefficients for that cross-section. The total sample size of 
                                                 
1 Debate exists on whether party identification and ideology should be considered fundamental in this 
sense. For example, Andersen et al. (2003) argue that party identification is not a fundamental variable but 
a short cut for other fundamentals such as issue positions. We accept this line of thinking. Nonetheless, we 
include ideology and party identification since it is more feasible than including all of their parts (a series 
of issue and socialization variables). 
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the Annenberg surveys employed is 29,544, which we divide into snapshots of 
approximately 1,000 respondents each. 
 
FIGURE 1 HERE 
 
Figure 1 plots the coefficient estimates (and standard errors) for each predictor 
over time. Most of the fundamentals show little change in their ability to predict the vote. 
Race tends to become a more powerful predictor with blacks more likely to support the 
Democratic candidate, Al Gore. In the early months of the primary election and again 
after securing delegates for the Republican Party nomination, George W. Bush worked 
very hard to show his compassionate conservatism by appealing to black Americans. This 
may have moved black votes out of equilibrium but it did not last long. Further, the 
relationship between ideology and the vote strengthened dramatically as the election 
drew near. As voters learned more about the issue stances of each candidate, ideology 
better separated Gore from Bush voters.  
 We can also show improvement in model fit as the election approaches. Figure 2 
plots the deviance per data point for each of the fitted logistic regression equations over 
time.2  Deviance is a general measure of error for generalized linear models (McCullagh 
and Nelder, 1989). This estimate is stable for large sample studies. It is a measure of 
misfit. A lower deviance implies the model is fitting better. To yield an average measure 
of fit, analogous to mean squared error, we divide the deviance by the total sample size of 
each cross-section studied. Figure 2 shows the deviance per respondent for each of our 
cross-sections of the Annenberg survey. The fundamentals are stronger predictors of vote 
choice as the election nears, with deviance per observation dropping from nearly 0.8 at 
the beginning of the series to below 0.7 just before the election. 
 
FIGURE 2 HERE 
 
Do we know that these findings can be attributed to activation of predispositions 
by campaign related information flows? No. It may be that no equilibrium level exists for 
these fundamentals. Rather than move toward equilibrium, they could move in a random 
walk strengthening when properly shocked. In this scenario, the effect of race and 
ideology cannot be predetermined. They strengthen (or remain dormant) heading toward 
Election Day based on the ability of one or more campaign(s) to manipulate these voter 
attributes. Presumably, then, the campaigns could have chosen to make income or region 
more important predictors over the course of the election season while ignoring race and 
ideology. 
Or, elections may be largely predetermined by the fundamentals in a process 
where predispositions are activated by campaign related information flows. Then, we 
expect the weight given to the fundamentals by the average voter during a survey just 
before one presidential election to become increasingly similar to the weights given the 
same fundamentals as the next presidential Election Day approaches. If true, the 
fundamentals will have been shown to revert back to equilibrium during high information 
campaign seasons. While they may deviate from this mean when elections are not salient, 
                                                 
2 Deviance is –2*log likelihood.  Deviance per observation is –2*∑ n(i=1) p(yi|xi,beta)/n; that is, the average 
value of the log likelihood of the fitted model, averaging over the n data points. 
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they return to equilibrium levels when called upon.3  We investigate this hypothesis using 
poll data from the 1996 and 2000 Presidential elections. 
 
Increasing Predictability of Individual Opinions as Campaign Progresses 
 
In 1996, Bob Dole, the Republican nominee, challenged incumbent Democrat Bill 
Clinton for the presidency. Each ran a well-funded campaign and received considerable 
press coverage. Campaign related information increased to voters as the election neared. 
The same story can be told of the 2000 presidential election except with Bush and Gore 
in leading roles. With mean reversion, we expect voters’ predispositions to have activated 
as the 1996 election approached, crystallizing on Election Day when information is at its 
highest. These predispositions then loosen as Election Day passes. They begin to 
crystallize again as the 2000 presidential election looms.4 
Under the mean reversion model, the process by which predispositions are 
activated in 1996 should be the same as the process in 2000 (at least to first 
approximation) with disregard to the differing candidacies and campaign strategies in 
those years (that which would promote disequilibrating campaign effects). We can test if 
this is true. Suppose the coefficients of the fundamentals from a 1996 vote choice 
equation are shown to explain the relationship between 2000 fundamentals and the 2000 
vote better as Election Day approaches. This would show evidence of activation 
unencumbered from year specific campaign effects. To see how much of vote choice is 
predetermined by the fundamentals, free from random walk campaign effects, we fit a 
logistic regression using the 1996 National Election Survey (NES), which was conducted 
shortly before the November election, to predict the vote preference from the 
fundamentals. Formally:  
 
Pr(Yi(1996)=1) = logit-1(Xi(1996) β (1996)) ,  (2) 
 
where individuals are subscripted i; Yi(1996) equals 1 or 0 for Dole or Clinton supporters, 
respectively; Xi(1996) represents a matrix of covariates (the fundamentals); and β (1996) 
represents a vector of coefficients for the 1996 presidential election. 
To apply this model to the 2000 election, we take the estimated vector β (1996) and 
multiply it by the corresponding variables from each snapshot t of the 2000 Annenberg 
surveys (Xit(2000)) to yield a linear predictor (Zit).  
 
Zit = Xi (2000) βt (1996)     (3) 
 
We use this as a predictor in a new logistic regression for the 2000 Annenberg vote 
choice item for the cross-sections conducted from early April to just before the election:  
 
Pr(Yit(2000)=1)  =  logit-1(α0t + α1tZit) ,   (4) 
 
                                                 
3 For example, Bafumi (2003) has found evidence that high information elections activate predispositions 
in political sophisticates that give them significantly higher reliability scores for ideological self-placement 
responses as compared to non-sophisticates. In low information contexts, the two groups look no different.  
4 For simplicity, we leave aside the effect of midterm elections for now. 
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where Yit(2000) equals 1 for Bush supporters. We fit this regression to each of our 
snapshots from the Annenberg surveys. We expect α1t, the coefficient of the prediction 
based on 1996, to increase toward 1 as Election Day 2000 nears.  For comparison, we 
also fit the model for the 2000 NES also using the 1996 NES weights.  
 
FIGURE 3 HERE 
 
Figure 3 shows the trend. The weights assigned to the fundamentals by registered 
voters in 1996 apply more strongly to vote choice in 2000 as the election draws near. 
Both the final Annenberg and NES surveys confirm that about 80% of the linear predictor 
from the 1996 fundamentals applies to the 2000 election. Naturally, one would ask about 
the remaining 20%. This residual could be accounted for by fundamentals not included in 
our model5 or by campaign effects that move beyond the activation of predispositions. 
Further research is needed to confirm or deny the existence of such random walk 
campaign effects in presidential elections. The evidence above, however, shows a clear 
and substantial effect for mean reverting campaign effects.  
To date, the search for such random walk campaign effects has been clouded by 
an unclear definition of what “Do campaigns matter?” means. This paper serves to help 
clarify the meaning of this question. It further creates a benchmark from which further 




Political candidates invest time, energy, and money into their campaigns. The 
effect of these campaigns may be to activate predispositions that achieve predictable 
votes or to force vote outcomes that would not have otherwise happened. In campaigns 
that are won based on local issues, where resources are severely unbalanced between the 
candidates and information flows are minimal, we expect both sorts of campaign effects 
to occur. Presidential election campaigns tend to be nationalized, highly competitive, and 
with high information. 
We posit that campaigns may activate predispositions so that votes are mean 
reverting or that they may engender out-of-equilibrium or random walk vote outcomes 
when shocked by biasing campaign information. Our findings from the 2000 election 
campaign are consistent with Gelman and King (1993) and Anderson et al. (2003) in 
finding a growing importance for the fundamentals as an election draws near and 
information flows activate predispositions.  
The fact that aggregate election outcomes and individual vote choice both move 
toward predictable outcomes, provides strong support for the findings of mean reversion 
campaign effects. This is consistent with the campaign effects found by Hillygus and 
Jackman (2003).  Thus, we do not criticize the empirical results of Hillygus and Jackman 
(2003), or their general perspective, but rather their belief that they have found definitive 
evidence of something beyond mean reversion. It may be that presidential election 
                                                 
5 These variables may be at the individual level or at the macro level such as economic performance, to the 
effect that these have different effects on different voters. 
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campaigns create or change vote preferences beyond activation of various predispositions 
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Figure 1: Coefficients with standard error bars for a series of logistic regression using the 
fundamentals to predict the probability of supporting Bush (among those supporting 
Bush or Gore) in the 200 days before the 2000 presidential election. Education is on a 1-
4 scale, income is on a 1-5 scale and party identification and ideology are represented as 
z-scores to adjust for different question wordings in different surveys. For each graph, a 
dotted line indicates zero effect. Lowess smoothed regression lines (Cleveland, 1979) 
show the trend in the coefficient for each predictor: race and ideology increase in 
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Figure 2: The deviance per observation summarizes the error in the 
logistic regression model predicting vote choice, as fit to each cross-
section of the Annenberg survey (coefficient estimates are displayed in 
figure 1). As shown by the lowess line, the model fit improves (that is, 
the deviance decreases) as the election draws near, indicating the 















































Figure 3: A prediction is generated using the coefficients from a 1996 vote 
choice equation and covariates from 2000 studies conducted up to 200 days 
out from the election. This prediction is then used as a covariate predicting 
2000 vote choice. The coefficients yielded are plotted above. Vote 
preference in 2000 can be better predicted by the 1996 fundamentals as the 
election draws near. A lowess smoother shows the trend. 
 
